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Abstract
Members of Parliament (MPs) request policy evaluations and use the resultant findings
to inform law-making and hold the government to account. Since most elected repre-
sentatives have developed strong ties to interest groups, one might wonder whether
these privileged relationships influence MPs’ parliamentary behavior. This study
investigates how MPs’ affiliations to groups affect their demand for policy evaluations.
Empirical evidence shows that, regardless of respective party or individual character-
istics, MPs are more likely to request evaluations in those policy domains where they
have a group affiliation. This effect holds even when controlling for a classical measure
of MP’s policy specialization, such as legislative committee membership. These findings
suggest that ties between MPs and specific types of interest group should be considered
when explaining parliamentary behavior across different policy domains.
Point for practitioners
To influence the policymaking process, interest groups participate in consultation pro-
cedures and parliamentary hearings, they lobby elected officials and deliver policy
expertise to decision-makers. These advocacy strategies are well studied. This article
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innovates by showing that, in addition, interest groups foster the development of policy
evaluations. MPs affiliated to an interest group active on a specific issue are likely to
request policy evaluations in that policy domain. Interest groups strengthen the parlia-
mentary demand for evaluation studies and, thus, may potentially contribute to the
accountability of government and public administration.
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citizen groups, economic groups, evaluation, policy domains
Introduction
Elected Members of Parliament (MPs) are both legislators and controllers of the
government. MPs require information to fulfill these law-making and oversight
functions. Policy evaluation is one potential source of such information, since a
policy evaluation aims to deliver new insights about the quality of a policy design,
the progress of its implementation and its final impacts on economy and society.
MPs are the stakeholders par excellence of policy evaluations (Speer et al., 2015),
whose results should reduce MPs’ uncertainty about policy effects and, further-
more, the information asymmetry between the government and the parliament.
Empirical studies have demonstrated that MPs activate different parliamentary
instruments (e.g. questions, interpellations, motions) to initiate an evaluation, to
monitor an evaluation process and to ask about concrete evaluation findings. In
addition, MPs directly use the knowledge provided to improve their own decision-
making and to hold government to account (Bundi, 2016; Jacob et al., 2015; Speer
et al., 2015; Zwaan et al., 2016). Previous research delivered three findings on the
factors explaining why an MP will demand or use a policy evaluation report. First,
MPs’ attention to evaluation is unequally distributed between policy sectors (e.g.
great attention to education or health policy versus low attention to public finance
or defense policy). Second, MPs belonging both to the opposition and to the
political parties forming the government (coalition) request evaluations: the
former need evaluative evidence to scrutinize and challenge the government, and
the latter instrumentalize evaluation to highlight and publicize the policy activities
and performance of their own ministers. Finally, socioeconomic as well as partisan
characteristics of MPs (e.g. age, education, seniority in parliament, party member-
ship) seem to have little to no influence at all on an MP’s evaluation activity. In
contrast, membership in an oversight committee as well as a positive attitude
towards evaluation in general increases MPs’ motivation to request evaluation
reports (Bundi, 2016).
The role of interest groups as a factor explaining the parliamentary requests of
policy evaluations remains unexplored. This is an important research gap since
evaluation reports are by no means the only source of policy-relevant information
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for MPs. Interest groups, which often represent the target groups or beneficiaries
of the policies to be evaluated, are a valued source of expertise. For instance,
interest groups deliver information through lobbying activities targeting individual
MPs, actively participate in official consultations procedures, and present testimo-
nies during the hearings organized by legislative committees. By means of these
advocacy strategies, interest groups provide their expertise as an ‘exchange good’
to access the parliamentary venue (Bouwen, 2002).
At the same time, interest groups also encourage MPs to evaluate specific pol-
icies. Evaluation might be highly rewarding for an interest group if the resulting
evaluation allows for keeping an issue important to the group constituency on the
parliamentary agenda, revising a law in a policy direction that better fits the group
preferences, or (re)legitimating the implementation tasks formally delegated to the
group. Various motivations lead interest groups to get involved in parliamentary
evaluation practice and this study considers the ties between MPs and groups to
investigate the following research question: What is the impact of interest groups on
MPs’ behavior related to evaluation requests? This question is not only relevant
from an empirical and theoretical point of view. It is also highly sensitive from a
normative stance. If interest groups do have a significant impact on the parliamen-
tary evaluation practice, then this could also have major implications for the dem-
ocratic accountability of policy processes and elected officials.
The article is structured as follows. The theoretical section introduces the
research hypotheses. The methodological section explains why the Swiss parlia-
ment is selected as a most likely case to test these hypotheses and shows that the
survey data collected are representative. It also presents the operationalization of
the main variables. The results section focuses on one major empirical finding:
MPs are more likely to demand policy evaluations in the policy domains of their
interest group affiliations. This effect holds even when controlling for a classical
measure of policy specialization such as legislative committee membership. Finally,
the concluding section puts this study into a broader perspective and identifies the
next research steps.
Theoretical framework
Both MPs and interest groups try to influence policy-making in order to realize the
policy preferences of their respective constituencies. However, major differences
between them are that interest groups do not compete for office, they cannot make
authoritative decisions and must cooperate with MPs in order to influence legis-
lative outputs. By contrast, MPs hold formal decision-making power, but regularly
interact with interest groups to increase their information resources and secure
their re-election. The MP–group linkage is frequently understood as an exchange
relationship. Groups provide technical expertise about the policy issue at stake and
political information about the policy position of their constituency to elected
MPs, or make contributions to their electoral campaign. As a counterpart, MPs
grant groups privileged access to an institutional venue (e.g. a hearing at a
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legislative committee) where policy decisions are made, or even commit themselves
to actively supporting legislative proposals promoted by groups (Berkhout, 2013).
Surveys of both interest groups (Rasmussen and Landeboom, 2013) and MPs
(Wonka, 2017) indicate that such partnerships are reported as crucial by both
sides. Previous scholarship has also demonstrated that the information transmitted
by groups to MPs predominantly concerns the feasibility and implementation of
policies (Baumgartner et al., 2009:132–33). Furthermore, when groups deliver
policy-relevant information, they target parties which share their ideological pref-
erences and policy positions. Linkages are established between like-minded groups
and MPs (Hall and Deardorff, 2006: 75): business groups predominantly support
the legislative activities of MPs belonging to right parties, while public interest
groups primarily help MPs from left parties to design workable policies (Gava
et al., 2017; Otjes and Rasmussen, 2017; Wonka, 2017). The present study con-
tributes to this literature by looking more deeply at the impact of MP–group links
on parliamentary evaluation practice. More concretely, we argue that interest
groups foster parliamentary evaluation demand.
Interest groups as catalysts
Beyond providing their own policy expertise and political intelligence to like-
minded MPs, interest groups also try to convince ‘their’ MPs to demand evalua-
tions that will deliver additional policy-relevant information. Three main reasons
motivate interest groups to advocate policy evaluation. First, evaluation might be
instrumentalized as a strategic tool to monitor all stages of the policy cycle.
Evaluation requests concern the (ex ante) regulatory impact assessments of
intended policies, the (in itinere) monitoring of implementation outputs or the
(ex post) measurement of policy effects. Consequently, the political use of evalu-
ation findings supports or hinders the agenda-setting of a new policy, and legit-
imates either the continuation, revision or termination of an existing policy (Eberli,
2017: 3). Interest groups encourage MPs to request evaluation with the deliberate
aim of pre-empting a new policy that contradicts the group’s preferences or, on the
contrary, of supporting policy outcomes that deliver benefits concentrated on their
members (Wilson, 1980). The following evaluation demand illustrates this strategy:
‘Before taking any additional measures to regulate the mortgage market and home
ownership, the Federal Council (i.e. the government) shall evaluate the effects of
the measures taken in the last two years in this field, and consult widely with
interested parties’ (Motion by MP O. Feller; 6 May 2014). This parliamentary
request was introduced by a right-wing Swiss MP, who was affiliated to several
business groups active in the real estate market, as a tactical move to delay any
policy change towards more state regulation on the mortgage market.
Second, like-minded groups and MPs often try to build ‘iron triangles’ with
public agencies sharing their policy preferences. If the consolidation of such policy
monopoly with a trustworthy agency is not feasible, then interest groups and MPs
face a classical agency problem. They have to delegate policy implementation to a
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public administration whose positions may differ from their own preferences. This
results in a series of common agency problems for the interest groups and their
MPs. The latter, as principals, cannot be sure whether the government and its
agencies implemented the policies in the way they were intended (McCubbins,
2014). Hence, MPs have strong incentives to control the government. In doing
so, evaluations seem to be an instrument for MPs to oversee agencies and to
provide accountability since agencies have to report on their activities and provide
information to MPs during evaluations (Bundi, 2016). As a consequence, MPs not
only gather information about a certain policy, but also about how it has been
implemented by the administration. For instance, one MP requested that the gov-
ernment evaluate the legal basis of the placement of foster children, as most of the
placement companies are said to focus on their own profit rather than on the
children’s benefit (Interpellation by MP J. Fehr, 15 December 2011). This evalu-
ation request was strongly influenced by a group committed to the interests of
foster children. Both the MP and the group feared that the well-being of the chil-
dren would be in danger without a sound implementation of the policy (Bundi,
2017: 5).
Third, performing a policy evaluation is costly. On the one hand, individual
MPs suffer from resource scarcity (i.e. time, money) when attempting to monitor
all developments in a policy field. On the other hand, groups do not always have
the resources or necessary access to public records (e.g. on policy outputs) to
produce their own expertise. Evaluation knowledge produced by the state has
thus one clear appealing characteristic for interest groups: by piggybacking on
the public sector, groups can outsource the cost of producing policy expertise.
Furthermore, if the evaluation results are eventually in line with the group’s posi-
tion, the policy expertise produced by the state can be presented as relatively
authoritative and objective during policy struggles. Even if the evalution results
does not correspond with the interest group’s position, MPs still have the possi-
bility of misusing the evaluation findings, either by manipulating or intentionally
misinterpreting them (Weiss, 1979). In sum, interest groups encourage MPs to
demand policy evaluation to assist ‘their’ MPs, as policy allies, in achieving their
shared policy preferences. The first hypothesis reads as follows:
H1: The more MPs have affiliations to interest groups, the more they demand eval-
uation requests.
Economic versus citizen groups
We have to note, however, that interest groups are likely to differ in their incen-
tives for relying on policy evaluations performed by the state. First, economic
groups (e.g. peak-level business associations) are probably better endowed with
financial resources and political staff than citizen groups (e.g. environmental or
humanitarian groups). They are more likely to provide MPs with private expertise,
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whose content can be controlled by the group itself, privileging it over policy
evaluations produced by the state. To counterbalance this comparative disadvan-
tage, citizen groups may resort more often to the evaluation knowledge produced
by the state. The incentives for piggybacking on state resources is higher for citizen
groups than for economic groups.
Second, evaluation reports are often discussed in the parliamentary arena and
are covered by the media as well. Evaluation reports thus contribute to raising
public attention about policy effects, supporting the outsider lobbying tactics priv-
ileged by cause groups rather than by sectional groups (Binderkrantz, 2005: 706;
Kriesi et al., 2007: 66). Indeed, the value of private expertise provided by business
groups declines as MPs, media and citizens care about the policy under evaluation
(Culpepper, 2011: 178). In short, the second hypothesis postulates:
H2: MPs with affiliations to economic groups demand less evaluation requests than
MPs with affiliations to citizen groups.
Policy specialization of groups and MPs
The two previous hypotheses may be further specified, since most MPs specialize in
one or a few policy domains. Indeed, MPs are members of legislative committees
focusing on specific policy issues and negotiate legislative proposals that are even-
tually adopted by the plenary assembly. Membership in a permanent legislative
committee fosters the specialization of MPs (Gilligan and Krehbiel, 1987; Searing,
1987; Strøm, 1990), who acquire a policy expertise that also grants them power and
prestige among party peers and the media. Accordingly, policy specialists are more
likely to request a policy evaluation on their domain of competence than MPs who
are not members of the relevant legislative committee.
Furthermore, interest groups prefer to lobby MPs sitting on the legislative
committees that address the policy issues which directly concern their group’s
members (Bowler and Farrell, 1995; Marshall, 2015: 323; Yordanova, 2009).
One might thus expect a topical congruence between the competence area of a
committee and the domain of activity of the groups with which MPs are affiliated.
Indeed, Eichenberger and Mach (2017) showed that, within the Swiss parliament,
MPs’ formal ties to groups strongly reflect the policy responsibilities of the respec-
tive committee. This substantive match is partially due to the strategic recruitment
of legislative committee members by interest groups, since many ties between
groups and MPs develop after MPs are assigned to specific committees.
These privileged relationships between committee members and groups are con-
sequential. An MP who has accepted a seat on the board of a specific group
arguably has a strong incentive to be proactive, within the relevant legislative
committee, on the policy issues that are of interest to the constituency of ‘his/
her’ group. In other words, we argue that MP–group ties have an additional
impact on parliamentary evaluation requests, beyond the MP’s policy
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specialization through committee membership, which will be introduced as a con-
trol variable in the statistical models. Within a given legislative committee, MPs
with ties to groups will probably demand more policy evaluations than MPs not
affiliated to groups. The third research hypothesis stipulates:
H3: Within a policy domain, MPs with more affiliations to interest groups are more
likely to demand policy evaluations than MPs with fewer or no affiliations to interest
groups.
In a nutshell, the theoretical framework claims that interest groups do matter for
MPs’ evaluation requests. However, citizen groups are more willing than economic
groups to encourage MPs to demand evaluation evidence and, furthermore, each
group concentrates on the policy issues that are of interest to their own members.
Research design
The present empirical study is based on a survey of all federal MPs in Switzerland,
who were asked to report on the importance of evaluation activities for their
parliamentary work. This section discusses three issues raised by this research
design: the selection of the Swiss case, the representativeness of the MPs survey,
and the empirical measurement of the key variables.
Case selection
The Swiss parliament is a most likely case to test the research hypotheses. First,
and in comparative perspective, the Swiss parliament enjoys a strong institutional
position vis-à-vis the government in terms of agenda-setting power, competences
of parliamentary committees, decision rights and instruments to control the exec-
utive (D€oring, 1995; Lüthi, 2014; Siaroff, 2003). Switzerland is, together with the
Scandinavian countries, a political system where parliament’s co-decision rights
are strong and the government’s control of the legislative agenda is weak (Vatter,
2014: 298–99). Therefore, the demands of policy evaluation are highly relevant for
Swiss MPs and, more generally, for the balance of power between executive and
legislative venues.
Second, policy evaluation is strongly institutionalized in Switzerland (Varone
et al., 2005). A general evaluation clause was introduced into the constitution 15
years ago: ‘The Federal Assembly shall ensure that federal measures are evaluated
with regard to their effectiveness’ (Article 170 of the Federal Constitution of April
1999). Sector-specific evaluation clauses can be found in primary or secondary
legislation and urge MPs to request evaluations in various policy domains.
Furthermore, parliamentary Control Committees commission the Parliamentary
Control of the Administration to evaluate the legality, expediency and effectiveness
of selected public policies. The Federal Audit Court is also habilitated to compare
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the costs and benefits of policy measures. The Swiss parliamentary evaluation
culture is among the most advanced in all OECD countries (Jacob et al., 2015).
Third, the Swiss parliament is an interesting case due to its ‘militia character’.
For decades, the Federal Assembly was basically ‘composed of amateurs who
combine their professional activities with their parliamentary duties’ (Kriesi,
2001: 60). The lack of MP resources resulting from this militia system increases
MPs’ dependence on interest groups (Bailer, 2011; Bütikofer, 2013). In fact, the
information resources that Swiss MPs have at their disposal are limited from a
comparative perspective (Schnapp and Harfst, 2005; Vatter, 2014). However, per-
manent legislative committees have been institutionalized since 1992, and MPs
have become increasingly competent in those policy fields covered by the special-
ized committees to which they belong (Pilotti, 2012). If MPs are more professional
nowadays, then interest groups could be expected to invest more intensively in the
parliamentary venue to influence them (Christiansen et al., 2016; Eichenberger and
Mach, 2017).
Finally, Swiss MPs are requested to declare their formal ties (i.e. seating in a
group’s board) with interest groups. The register of interests is a rich source of
observational data showing that the average number of interest ties per MP has
more than doubled over the last decade, from 3.5 in 2000 to 7.6 in 2011 (Gava
et al., 2017). In sum, the Swiss parliament offers an ideal setting for investigating
the influence of interest group advocacy on MPs’ evaluations requests.
Survey
The second methodological issue concerns the representativeness of the survey that
we conducted in 2014 among the 245 federal MPs (Eberli et al., 2014). With
112MPs answering the survey, the response rate (45.7 percent) is relatively high
for legislative surveys in Switzerland and abroad (Bütikofer, 2013; Deschouwer
and Depauw, 2014). Table 2 (in the online Appendix) compares the participants of
the survey with all invited MPs regarding different characteristics. The four major
parties (Swiss People’s Party, Social Democrats, Liberals, and Christian
Democrats) are reasonably represented in the survey (i.e. 80.4 percent in the
survey to 80.8 percent in parliament). Concerning MPs’ gender, language and
age, the sample is relatively balanced as well. MPs with parliamentary seniority
between eight and 11 years are underrepresented in the survey sample (13.4 percent
to 18.0 percent). In contrast, almost no differences can be observed regarding the
committee memberships and the number of parliamentary interventions which
were submitted by the MPs. Hence, no self-selection bias invalidates the empirical
analysis (Bundi et al., 2016).
Measurement of variables
The survey data measure MPs’ activities related to policy evaluation. As MPs may
have a broad understanding of what policy evaluation is, the survey introduced an
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explicit definition: ‘In this survey, evaluations are interpreted as studies, reports or
other documents, which assess a state’s measure in a systematic and transparent
way with respect to their effectiveness, efficiency or fitness for purpose.’ The depen-
dent variable investigated is the demand for policy evaluations. MPs were asked to
report whether they have requested policy evaluations in different policy domains
by means of parliamentary interventions during the last four years (i.e. 1 March
2010–20 June 2014).
To capture relationships between MPs and interest groups, we make use of the
official register of MPs’ interests: Swiss MPs have been required since 1985 to
declare all their mandates (e.g. executive boards seats) with companies and interest
groups. For the period 2012–14, the year-based ‘raw’ inventory of the register
allows us to identify 602 dyads between the 112 MPs who participated in the
survey, and 544 interest groups. We capture two distinct but complementary
dimensions of interest groups. First, we assess the diversity of interest groups by
means of two main types (Binderkrantz et al., 2015): (1) Economic groups encom-
pass private firms, business associations (e.g. the Industry and Trade Association),
occupational groups (e.g. the Swiss Medical Association) and unions at the sector
and peak levels (e.g. the Federation of TradeUnions). (2) Citizen groups correspond
to public interest groups, whose members focus on the attainment and protection of
common goods (e.g. environmental groups or humanitarian organizations) and
identity groups (e.g. representing women, tenants, drivers, etc.), leisure groups
(e.g. Scout groups, orchestras’ support associations, Swiss Olympics, etc.), religious
groups (e.g. Swiss Evangelical Alliance or abbeys’ support associations) and asso-
ciations representing institutional actors, such as Swiss cities.
Second, we rely on the 20 policy domains of the Comparative Agendas Project
(http://www.comparativeagendas.net) to code the main sector of activity for each
interest group. We then aggregate these data in 10 broader categories of policy
domains in order to match those areas with the policy domains of the parliamen-
tary interventions: Foreign Affairs and Security, Public Finance, Welfare,
Economy, Education, Energy, Spatial Planning and Infrastructure, Health,
Justice and Migration, and State Affairs. For example, the first evaluation request
presented above showed that an MP affiliated to interest groups active in the real
estate market demanded an evaluation of the regulation of the mortgage market.
In this case, both the policy content of the evaluation request and the main area of
activity of the interest groups affiliated to the MP concern the same policy domain,
namely ‘economy’. It is worth noting that the policy domains do not overlap with
the two group types. For example, within the health policy domain, economic
groups such as business associations representing private health insurances, or
occupational groups representing medical professions, cohabitate with citizen
groups such as public interest groups representing all patients, or identity
groups representing people with specific disabilities. Table 3 in the online
Appendix provides an overview of the policy domains.
Finally, information about the control variables stems from the survey of MPs
and includes gender, age, education, language region, occupational background,1
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party affiliation, Lower and Upper House, professionalization, membership in
oversight and legislative committees, and parliamentary experience. Table 4 in
the online Appendix presents the operationalization of all variables.
In order to assess the impact of group affiliations in specific policy domains as
formulated in H3, the survey data set has been stacked in a matrix that derives
from a normal one, as the units of analysis do not represent a single MP, but an
MPPolicy domain combination (Van der Eijk et al., 2006). Hence, each MP is
represented by as many cases as there are policy domains (i.e. 10 domains in this
case). An entry was generated for every policy domain that indicated whether
an MP has submitted a parliamentary request in a certain policy domain. By
using this approach, we can estimate the influence of groups in different policy
domains. Since the data are nested in two different levels (MP, policy domain), the
study uses a multi-level analysis in order to estimate the models. Moreover, we
assume that the variance of the second level is varying, which is why we use a
random intercept model to test variables on the two levels. As the outcome of the
endogenous variable is binary, we use a logistic regression model. The following
model is used to estimate the MP’s likelihood of submitting a parliamentary
request:
Yij ¼ c00 þ u0ij þ eij (1)
Where Y is likelihood of an MP (i) to demand an evaluation in a policy domain
( j), while c00 stands for the random intercept and u0ij for the overall regression
slopes. eij refers to the random residual error term at two levels.
Results
More than 50 percent of the 112 MPs participating in the survey demanded an
evaluation in the four years prior to the survey (i.e. between 2010 and 2014). About
20 percent of the MPs submitted one parliamentary request to demand an evalu-
ation. One-third of MPs even submitted several requests. However, the evaluation
demand is unequally distributed among the policy domains. While the MPs fre-
quently demanded an evaluation in the policy domains Welfare and Economy, the
areas Education, Energy, and Public Finances were less often targeted by parlia-
mentary requests.
Model 1 tests whether the number of interest groups linked to an MP has an
influence on the general evaluation demand (see Table 1). Results indicate that the
number of ties to distinct interest groups does not influence an MP’s likelihood of
requesting an evaluation. The first research hypothesis is thus not supported by
empirical evidence. In contrast, some socioeconomic characteristics influence MPs’
likelihood of submitting parliamentary requests in order to evaluate a policy mea-
sure. Women are more likely to demand evaluations than men, so are MPs from
the minority French- and Italian-speaking regions. Moreover, MPs with an
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independent work logic (e.g. farmers, company owners) are less likely to demand
evaluations than MPs with dependent work logic professions. By contrast, parlia-
mentary characteristics (i.e. professionalization, experience, oversight committee,
party affiliation) do not affect evaluation demand.
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LR v2 16.54 16.82
Pseudo R2 0.128
Wald v2 65.12***
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Model 2 investigates the impact of MP ties to economic groups versus citizen
groups. The estimates of model 2 show that ties to economic or citizen groups do
not influence whether an MP demands an evaluation. This result does not provide
evidence for the second hypothesis.
Finally, model 3 presents the results of the impact of interest affiliations in
specific policy domains. In comparison to policy domains in which MPs do not
have any ties to interest groups, MPs with the maximum ties to the interest groups
(n¼15) have almost a 53.8 percent higher probability of demanding an evalution in
this particular policy field. Figure 1 illustrates this empirical finding. The horizon-
tal axis refers to the number of ties in a policy domain, while the y-axis shows the
predicted probability to demand an evaluation regarding different policy fields. In
order to control for the legislative committee effect, a traditional measure of MP
policy specialization, we distinguish between MPs who are members of a legislative
committee of a policy domain (dashed line) and those who are not (solid line).
MPs’ have a 30 percent higher probability of demanding an evaluation in a policy
field if they are members of a legislative committee and have interest group affili-
ations in this policy domain. In contrast, the likelihood is 50 percent higher if the
MPs are not members of a policy-specific policy field, but have affiliations to
interest groups in this policy domain. Although legislative committee members
have a higher probability of demanding an evaluation, the effect also increases
with the number of ties to groups in a specific policy domain. Ties to interest
Figure 1 Predicted probabilities of demanding an evaluation for the policy domain.
Note: Predicted probabilities of demanding an evaluation with a parliamentary request, as a
function of the policy domain and member of a legislative committee (dashed line) and non-
member of a legislative committee (solid line). The values are calculated for MPs with the
following attributes: men, center-right party, German-speaking, independent work logic, non-
oversight committee, and Lower House. All other variables are at the median.
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groups in a certain policy field thus have a positive effect on evaluation requests in
this specific policy domain, even though the effect of committee membership is
more substantial. The committee effect confirms previous studies showing that
MPs want to build a reputation in their area of legislative specialization
(Proksch and Slapin, 2011). However, the interest group effect provides new evi-
dence about the motives and incentives driving legislators’ demand for policy
evaluations. Bundi (2017) shows that MPs’ motives to demand policy evaluations
are strongly linked to committee membership. While oversight committee members
more often demand evaluations in order to obtain information on a policy, legis-
lative committee members seek to change policy outcomes. Our findings suggest
that, through their ties with MPs, interest groups may influence the policy agenda
by means of policy evaluations. The evidence indicates that the parliamentary
behavior of MPs is shaped by their links with interest groups. In sum, the analysis
provides strong support for the third hypothesis.
To sum up, the empirical analysis shows that MP–group ties influence parlia-
mentary behavior. However, it is the specialization of groups in specific policy
domains that is crucial for the relationship between MPs’ affiliations to groups
and evaluation demands. As expected by the third hypothesis, MPs demand more
evaluations in those policy domains which are most relevant to their groups.
Contrary to the first theoretical expectation, the number of ties to different
groups does not determine whether an MP will demand an evaluation.
Moreover, the type of groups (economic vs. citizen groups) to which MPs are
affiliated does not seem to affect the demand for policy evaluations by MPs.
Conclusion
Previous scholarship on the parliamentary evaluation practice showed that party
politics does not explain why some MPs are more likely than others to ask for
policy evaluations (Bundi, 2016; Speer et al., 2015). The present study corroborates
this finding. Furthermore, it has the added value of proposing an innovative expla-
nation of MPs’ motivation to submit an evaluation request, namely the linkages
between interest groups and MPs. It is argued that MPs interact with groups
sharing their political priorities and policy preferences. Both partners focus on
the same policy domain and, accordingly, monitor the legislative developments
that affect their respective constituencies. Groups assist MPs to request policy
evaluations in specific policy domains and, thus, to perform their oversight func-
tion. They provide policy expertise and political intelligence as well as financial
resources to MPs who, as their counterpart, introduce evaluation requests about
policy issues that are important for the groups’ constituencies. This claim is sup-
ported by empirical evidence from the Swiss parliament. The positive effect of
linkages between MPs and interest groups on evaluation demand in specific
policy fields remains present even when controlling for committee membership.
Some policy domains are characterized by the strong presence of economic
groups, while citizen groups populate others (Coen and Katsaitis, 2013).
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The very nature of policy domains affects the density and diversity ofMP–group ties
and, eventually, parliamentary behavior related to policy evaluation. The impor-
tance of systematically comparing policy domains has been acknowledged by schol-
ars working on the ‘ecology of groups population’ (Gray and Lowery, 1996) or on
‘Chameleon pluralism’ (Richardson and Coen, 2009: 338); it should also be put on
the research agenda of parliamentary evaluation studies. This research avenue is
also relevant for normative debates on the quality of democratic representation,
policy responsiveness and accountability. Indeed, the electoral delegation chain
might be broken if, for instance, MPs are closer to the policy preferences of ‘their’
interest groups than those of their electoral constituency (Giger and Klüver, 2016).
This exploratory article has three limitations that could be overcome by upcom-
ing studies. First, it was argued that Switzerland is a most likely case to test the
three research hypotheses since the parliament is institutionally strong vis-à-vis the
government, non-professional MPs interact intensively with interest groups, and
the policy evaluation culture is well developed. Swiss institutions are an enabling
context for the impact of MP–group ties on parliamentary interventions asking for
policy evaluations. To assess the external validity of the empirical results presented
here, this study should be replicated in Westminster systems, highly professional-
ized parliaments and countries with a less developed policy evaluation practice.
Second, interest groups are one information source among many for MPs. The
policy expertise provided by parliamentary committees, MPs’ party staff and civil
servants is also relevant for the law-making and oversight functions that MPs
fulfill. The influence of interest groups on the parliamentary evaluation practice
should thus not be overestimated before these additional information sources are
also taken into consideration.
Finally, this study has investigated under which conditions MPs rely on parlia-
mentary instruments to initiate a policy evaluation process. The next logical step
would be to scrutinize whether these parliamentary requests translate into concrete
evaluation mandates and, eventually, if MPs use the findings of the evaluation
reports that are produced to improve legislation and/or to increase the
government’s accountability. MP–group ties could also play an important role
fostering – or, on the contrary hindering – such policy feedback loops. If the
policy recommendations from an evaluation report run against the preferences
of an interest group, then one can reasonably expect this group to develop an
advocacy strategy with counter-arguments to pre-empt the use of evaluation
results. So, it would make sense to compare the relative strength of interest
groups as evaluation entrepreneurs versus veto players trying to block policy-
making based on empirical evaluation evidence.
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Supplementary Material
Tables 2, 3, 4 are available online. Please see http://journals.sagepub.com/home/ras.
Note
1. Oesch (2006) distinguishes four different types of work logics: independent (self-
employed), technical work logic (work process determined by technical production),
organizational work logic (bureaucratic division of labor), and interpersonal work
logic (service-based on face-to-face exchange).
References
Bailer S (2011) People’s voice or information pool? The role of, and reasons for, parliamen-
tary questions in the Swiss parliament. Journal of Legislative Studies 17(3): 302–314.
Baumgartner FR, Berry JM, Hojnacki M, Leech BL and Kimball DC (2009) Lobbying
and Policy Change: Who Wins, Who Loses and Why. Chicago, IL: Chicago University
Press.
Berkhout J (2013) Why interest organizations do what they do: Assessing the explanatory
potential of ‘exchange’ approaches. Interest Groups & Advocacy 2(2): 227–250.
Binderkrantz A (2005) Interest groups strategies: Navigating between privileged access and
strategies of pressure. Political Studies 53: 694–715.
Binderkrantz A, Christiansen PM and Pedersen HH (2015) Interest group access to the
bureaucracy, parliament, and the media. Governance 28(1): 95–112.
Bouwen P (2002) Corporate lobbying in the European Union: The logic of access. Journal of
European Public Policy 9(3): 365–390.
Bowler S and Farrell DM (1995) The organizing of the European parliament: Committees,
specialization and co-ordination. British Journal of Political Science 25(2): 219–243.
Bundi P (2016) What do we know about the demand for evaluations? Insights from the
parliamentary arena. American Journal of Evaluation 37(4): 522–541.
Bundi P (2017) Parliamentarians’ strategies for policy evaluations. Evaluation and Program
Planning. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.evalprogplan.2017.02.003
Bundi P, Varone F, Gava R. and Widmer T (2016) Self-selection and misreporting in
legislative surveys. Political Science Research and Methods. doi:10.1017/psrm.2016.35
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Proksch SO and Slapin JB (2011) Parliamentary questions and oversight in the European
Union. European Journal of Political Research 50(1): 53–79.
Rasmussen A and Landeboom G-J (2013) Interest group–party linkage in the twenty-first
century: Evidence from Denmark, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. European
Journal of Political Research 52: 264–289.
16 International Review of Administrative Sciences 0(0)
Richardson J and Coen D (2009) Institutionalisation and managing intermediation in the
EU. In: D Coen and J Richardson (eds) Lobbying the EU. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, pp. 325–338.
Schnapp K-U and Harfst P (2005) Parlamentarische Informations- und Kontrollressourcen
in 22 westliche Demokratien. Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen 36: 348–370.
Searing DD (1987) New roles for postwar British politics: Ideologues, generalists. special-
ists, and the progress of professionalization in Parliament. Comparative Politics 19(4):
431–452.
Siaroff A (2003) Varieties of parliamentarism in the advanced industrial democracies.
International Political Science Review 24: 445–464.
Speer S, Pattyn V and de Peueter B (2015) The growing role of evaluation in parliaments:
Holding government accountable? International Review of Administrative Sciences 81(1):
37–57.
Strøm K (1990) A behavioral theory of competitive political parties. American Journal of
Political Science 34(2): 565–598.
Van der Eijk C, Van der Brug W, Kroh M and Franklin M (2006) Rethinking the dependent
variable in voting behavior: On the measurement and analysis of electoral utilities.
Electoral Studies 25(3): 424–447.
Varone F, Jacob S and De Winter L (2005) Polity, politics and policy evaluation in Belgium.
Evaluation 11(3): 253–273.
Vatter A (2014) Das politische System der Schweiz. Baden-Baden: Nomos.
Weiss CH (1979) The many meanings of research utilization. Public Administration Review
39(5): 426–431.
Wilson JQ (1980) The Politics of Regulation. New York: Basic Books.
Wonka A (2017) German MPs and interest groups in EU multilevel policy-making: The
politics of information exchange. West European Politics 40(5): 1004–1024.
Yordanova N (2009) The rationale behind committee assignment in the European
Parliament: Distributive, informational and partisan perspectives. European Union
Politics 10(2): 253–280.
Zwaan P, Van Voorst S and Mastenbroek E (2016) Ex-post legislative evaluations in the
European Union: Questioning the use of evaluation as instruments for accountability.
International Review of Administrative Sciences 82(4): 674–693.
Frédéric Varone is Professor of Political Science at the University of Geneva. His
research interests include comparative public policy and interest groups.
Pirmin Bundi is Lecturer and Post-Doctoral Researcher at the University of Bern.
His research interests include policy evaluation and parliamentary behavior.
Roy Gava is Lecturer and Post-Doctoral Researcher at the University of Geneva.
His research interests include financial regulation and legislative production.
Varone et al. 17
